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I. INTRODUCTION 
  
‘Stabilisation’, ‘stability operations’ and ‘instability’ are relatively new terms in  the  
conflict transformation lexicon and the literature on these areas has grown 
significantly over a fairly short time period.  For better or for worse, knowledge in 
this area has been shaped predominantly by the formative experiences in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  These operations are based on a view that weak and 
failing states pose a direct threat to wider international and national security.   
This article provides a literature survey which takes this sentiment and these two 
significant operations as its points of departure, particularly in light of the 
significance of 9/11 as a defining moment in thinking about international security 
and the nature of the international system. One trend has been to situate 
analyses of stability operations in the broader context of instability and fragile 
states, with early warning and statebuilding as core concepts, and in part formed 
by the experiences of counter-insurgency and its attendant military doctrine.  
Notwithstanding these experiences, the literature on stabilisation operations has 
not yet matured sufficiently to join with related areas of research in a more 
systematic and explicitly theoretical way.  Nor has a systematic, academic and 
referenced literature based on these cases yet emerged.  National and regional 
perspectives which have shaped case studies are reliant upon Afghanistan and 
Iraq and finding any references to stabilisation operations beyond these two 
theatres is not forthcoming.1  Thus, the gap in the analytical literature is 
particularly acute at the level of evidence and analysis, which limits the deeper 
examination of the inter-linkages and interdependencies across actors and 
activities involved, particularly in understanding the challenges for achieving a 
more coherent ‘whole-of-government’ approach to future stabilisation 
interventions.  
 
We have identified four broad areas which have influenced the assumptions and 
which form the foundation for the emerging stabilisation operations literature. 
Each is predicated on the overarching concept of the ‘security-development’ - 
and emerging awareness of the ‘security-governance’ – nexus.  However, the 
                                                 
1
 Whilst the authors acknowledge the earlier works of the counter-insurgency concept and efforts 
in Europe’s post-colonial experiences, the only other article which offers a ‘fresh’ view on 
stabilisation challenges outside the Afghanistan and Iraq experience is Dr Jeremy Brickhill’s 
account of Darfur, which was published by the Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies, Paper 
No. 138, 2006? 
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lines between the categories are blurred and many of the works belong in more 
than one:  
 
• Failed and Fragile States, Fragility and Instability 
• Counter-Insurgency Operations (COIN) 
• Early Recovery 
• Statebuilding and Peacebuilding 
 
These areas will be explored in the context of stabilisation operations, with initial 
analyses focusing on situating stabilisation operations within the broader 
literature on state fragility, Civil Military Coordination (CIMIC), and 
Counterinsurgency (COIN).  The paper will then explore key challenges to 
‘whole-of-government stabilisation’, underscoring the importance of addressing 
inter-linkages and interdependencies to inform future analysis in this area.  
 
 
II. SOURCES  
 
This literature survey focuses on material in the public domain including recent 
US and UK doctrine and government and inter-governmental policy, books, book 
chapters and scholarly articles, think-tank and NGO reports and conference 
papers. Important conceptual development has emerged from the leading 
countries of UK, US, and Canada based primarily on experiences in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, but with broader applicability to countries at risk of instability.  The 
selection criterion has been rigorous.  However, the authors acknowledge that, 
due to the currency of stabilisation interventions, the bibliography remains a 
work-in-progress.  
 
This article reviews the current literature on stabilisation and summarises the 
main messages, key trends, and knowledge gaps.  It then challenges 
assumptions underlying the debate and present a series of innovative thoughts 
supporting policy development and capacity-building in this area.  
 
 
III. SITUATING STABILISATION OPERATIONS 
 
The events of 11 September 2001 ushered in a new development and security 
paradigm with far-reaching and global implications. This new paradigm included 
a shift in thinking which identified fragile and failed states as national security 
threats. Fragile states are viewed as both a major development challenge and a 
leading source of transnational threats to global security.  The prevailing view is 
that it is no longer acceptable or appropriate to avoid engaging with failed states, 
that fragile states constitute a threat to wider regional and global security, and 
that the costs of late response to crises are high.  This has forced increased,   
and often contentious and difficult collaboration between the development and 
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military communities. The emergence of this shift has been demonstrated in 
Afghanistan and Iraq with not completely satisfactory results.  
 
Stabilisation operations sit at the ‘intersection’ of overlapping definitions, 
concepts and activities. “The notion of ‘stabilisation’ or stabilisation operations 
has emerged precisely because of the difficulty to categorize activities that fall 
into a grey zone in between military and civilian responsibilities.”2  This section 
will set out and compare the UK and US definitions of stabilisation.  It will then 
discuss these in the wider context of the four broad areas identified by the 
research which have influenced the assumptions and formed the foundation for 
the emerging stabilisation operations literature: Failed and Fragile States, 
Fragility and Instability; COIN, Early recovery; and Statebuilding and 
Peacebuilding. 
 
• WHAT IS STABILISATION? 
 
Considerable energy has been spent grappling with stabilisation terminologies 
and definitions, particularly by the UK and US militaries, but also increasingly by 
the inter-agency units created by those governments.  The UK has established 
the Stabilisation Unit, the US has its Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 
and Stabilisation (O/CRS) and Canada has created the Stabilisation and 
Reconstruction Task Force (START). Each national entity is dedicated to 
operationalising ‘whole-of-government’ or ‘3-D’ (defence, diplomacy and 
development) approaches.  Such approaches have been applauded for providing 
better-informed diagnosis and ongoing analysis of security-related interventions3 
and therefore provide a critical foundation for an evolving stabilisation debate 
which relies on effective civil-military integration. 
 
Whilst the Canadian Government has focused on the structural and resource 
development of its START concept, the UK and the US have both prioritized the 
conceptual development of stabilization operations.  While the terminology and 
the fundamentals underpinning stabilisation are complementary  between the two 
countries,  the focus of each is slightly different. Each national approach makes 
the link between the requirement for stabilisation interventions in places where 
host governments are weak or have lost the capacity to govern effectively, thus 
stressing the threat posed by instability and fragility.  As a result, some analysts 
have observed that those conducting such operations must often assume, at 
least temporarily, many roles of the state while simultaneously trying to rebuild 
that capacity.4 
 
                                                 
2
 Baumann, Andrea Barbara, "Clash of Organisational Cultures? The Challenge of integrating 
civilian and military efforts in stabilisation operations" RUSI Journal December 2008, Vol 153, No 
6, pp 70-73. p 71.  
3
 Ann M Fitz-Gerald, 2008 
4
 Bensahel, Nora, Olga Oliker and Heather Peterson, Improving Capacity for Stabilisation and 
Reconstruction Operations, Washington, DC: Rand, 2009, p.13 
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The UK Government’s Stabilisation Unit defines stabilisation as 
 
[…]the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to 
resurgence in violence and a break-down in law and order are managed 
and reduced, whilst efforts are made to support preconditions for 
successful longer-term development’.5[…] it is a summary term for the 
complex processes that have to be undertaken in countries experiencing, 
or emerging from, violent conflict to achieve peace and security and a 
political settlement that leads to legitimate government. 6 
 
The new and much anticipated British doctrine JDP 3-40, Security and 
Stabilisation: The Military Contribution sets out an approach which emphasises 
the role of prevention or reduction of violence and stresses the desired outcomes 
of political settlement leading to a legitimate state with longer-term social and 
economic development.  Clearly the UK and the US are intellectual partners in 
driving the stabilisation agenda forward, with the primary difference being one of 
nuance, with the UK approach leaning more towards principles and the US 
approach being slightly more prescriptive and dogmatic.  The UK’s JDP-3-40 
defines stabilization as:  
 
[…]the process that supports states which are entering, enduring or 
emerging from conflict, in order to prevent or reduce violence; protect the 
population and key infrastructure; promote political processes and 
governance structures which lead to a political settlement that 
institutionalises non-violent contests for power; and prepares for 
sustainable social and economic development.7  
 
The much heralded US doctrine, FM 3-07 ‘Stability Operations’ focuses on the  
comprehensive approach to stabilisation efforts through the coordination of 
national instruments of power that can be brought to bear on situations of 
instability or fragility in order to stabilise ungoverned areas. “Stability Operations 
constitute the Army’s approach to the conduct of full spectrum operations in any 
environment across the spectrum of conflict. This doctrine focuses on achieving 
unity of effort through a comprehensive approach to stability operations, but 
                                                 
5
 The Stabilisation Unit, previously named the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), is jointly 
owned by the Department for International Development (DFID), Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) and Ministry of Defense (MOD) the three “parent Departments”. It provides 
specialist, targeted assistance in countries emerging from violent conflict where the UK is helping 
to achieve a stable environment that will enable longer term development to take place.  See 
www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk for more details 
6
 Stabilisation Unit Guidance Note p. 2 
7
 UK  JDP 340 SECURITY AND STABILISATION: THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION AH LEVEL 
WORKING DRAFT 31 Jan 2009 
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remains consistent with, and supports the execution of, a broader “‘whole-of-
government’” approach as defined by the United States Government (USG).”8 
 
 An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and 
activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other 
instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure 
environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency 
infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.“9 
 
In addition, the American think-tank RAND has added to the definitional arena by 
setting stabilisation operations in the context of other activities as one component 
of a wide range of possible operations including reconstruction, intervention, and 
COIN, as part of wider post-conflict operation that underpins statebuilding.  
 
The family of efforts grouped together under stabilisation and 
reconstruction encompasses a range of overlapping missions that are 
themselves components of a broad range of different engagements and 
approaches. Stabilisation… generally refers to the effort to end conflict 
and social, economic, and political upheaval. …Stabilisation, thus defined, 
is one component of a wide range of possible operations…. stabilisation 
can be carried out as part of an intervention. Indeed, it can be the express 
purpose of an intervention to end violence. It is also crucial in the 
aftermath of combat operations, which may have intentionally or 
unintentionally helped spur additional conflict. Stabilisation is also an 
accepted component of counterinsurgency operations because efforts to 
gain local support, which are so central to counterinsurgency, generally 
require ending violence and upheaval. Counterterrorism operations may 
also include a stabilisation component.10 
 
• Stabilisation and Fragile States  
 
While the new security paradigm sets out fragile states as both a development 
and security challenge, there is little coherence amongst governments or within 
governments about what constitutes a fragile state or conditions of instability, and 
no single donor has formulated a government-wide fragile states strategy.  The 
US Department of Defense’s FM 3-07 states that “the term fragile state refers to 
the broad spectrum of failed, failing, and recovering states. The distinction 
among them is rarely clear, as fragile states do not travel a predictable path to 
failure or recovery.”11  There are also numerous policy documents which outline 
                                                 
8
 US HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FM 3-07 (FM 100-20): Stability 
Operations, October 2008 
9
 The US Army’ Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) uses concepts from FM 
3-07 and Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 
10
 Bensahel, Nora, Olga Oliker and Heather Peterson, Improving Capacity for Stabilisation and 
Reconstruction Operations, Washington, DC: Rand, 2009, p. 3 
11
 US Army FM 3 07, 1-46 
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both frameworks for instability and suggested responses. The concept appears 
to be most popular among the development community ministries, although in 
some donor governments, this remit becomes elevated to a more executive-led 
role.  The UK concept of ‘horizon-scanning’, led initially through the Prime 
Minister’s Strategy Unit (PMSU), serves as a good example.  The new UK 
doctrine JDP 3-40 makes the explicit link between fragility and threats to UK 
national security and sets out a framework for fragility and failed states.  
Importantly, both the UK12 and US13 military situate their stabilisation doctrines 
within the context of fragile states and each sets out the conditions of fragility in 
which the military will find itself, including insecurity, declining economic 
environment, weak governance and rule of law.  However, the lack of a unified 
strategic vision on the concept of instability results in a welter of competing white 
papers and policy statements from different agencies, bilateral and multilateral 
actors. 
 
The threat posed by failed and fragile states formed a core part of the first draft of 
the UK’s National Security Strategy (NSS)14 - which was released in March 2008 
- and its approach to international security.  The May 2009 publication of what 
became known in London as the ‘NSS 2’15 reiterated the importance of failed and 
fragile states.  With such a flurry of activities surrounding security-related strategy 
documents at both Cabinet and line ministry levels, the July 2009 announcement 
of an impending new ‘Strategic Defence Review’16 came as not surprise..  Based 
on the current UK MOD priority countries (including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 
Nepal), there is no doubt that the issue of failed and fragile states will feature 
throughout.  
 
The UK ‘NSS 2’ has built on efforts to grapple with the issues of, and threats 
posed by, instability and the linkages to the UK’s crisis response.  Integration is a 
key component of the UK approach17 as evidenced by the statement in the 2008 
NSS publication which reads:  “The UK strategy for dealing with countries at risk 
of instability requires a joined-up Diplomatic, Development, Military and Justice 
responses.”18  The most recent document underlines the importance of 
stabilisation, civilian stabilisation advisers and the stabilisation fund.19  A linkage 
is also made between stabilisation and conflict prevention, which highlights the 
                                                 
12
 UK JDP 340, chapter 2, section 2.  
13
 US Army FM 3 07, 1-45 -1-47 
14
 UK National Security Strategy 2008. It was designed to build on a revised version of the earlier 
Strategic Defence Review, the cross-government counter-terrorism strategy of 2006 and the new 
strategic framework for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). 
http://interactive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/documents/security/national_security_strategy.pdfhttp://inter
active.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/documents/security/national_security_strategy.pdf 
15
 See The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom:  Security in an Interdependent 
World, Cabinet Office publication, June 2009, p.13. 
16
 On ? July 2009, the UK Ministry of Defence announced that a ‘root and branch’ Strategic Defence 
Review would be undertaken. 
17
 UK National Security Strategy 2008, 2.6 p. 8 
18
 UK National Security Strategy 2008. 
19
 Ibid, p.27 
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need to link wider stabilisation efforts to pre-conflict vulnerabilities and situations 
of fragility and to guard against the use of stabilisation as a post-conflict 
instrument only.  Arguably, the global economic recession has forced leading 
donor countries to focus most of their resources on priority countries – most of 
which are conflict or post-conflict countries.  Much work is still required in linking 
a more strategic approach to conflict prevention with stabilisation response 
priorities (and thereby becoming more strategic about stabilisation). 
 
The challenge of forging better coherency between instability/fragility and 
stabilisation applies to both the bilateral and multilateral communities.  While 
there is no agreed global list of fragile states and there is disagreement about 
what constitutes fragility, each national fragile states policy is informed by 
organisational perspectives and national politics.  Some countries have produced 
cross-departmental policies on fragility, however, these policies distinctly avoid 
the production of lists given political and diplomatic implications.20 The UK’s 
definition of fragile states covers those states where “the government cannot or 
will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor. The 
most important functions of the state for poverty reduction are territorial control, 
safety and security, capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic 
services, and the ability to support the ways in which the poorest people sustain 
themselves.”21 The World Bank and the UN have spent considerable time in 
developing other criteria which have similar threads of analysis including the WB 
lists of countries under the Low Income Countries Under Stress, (LICUS), and 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiatives. 22 
 
Amongst the development community the most predominant and authoritative 
literature has been developed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC).  The 
research suggests that “states in fragile and post-conflict situations are an 
impediment to development, growth, investment and international security.”23  
The OECD Fragile States Group paper, From Fragility to Resilience argues that 
fragility emerges when the political process that reconciles citizens’ expectations 
of the state and state expectations of citizens with the states’ capacity to delivery 
services fails.24  The OECD-DAC recommendations place statebuilding squarely 
at the centre of efforts to help countries move out of fragility which – the Paris-
                                                 
20
 For example the French development cooperation department has developed a fragile states 
policy, Interministerial Committee on International Cooperation and Development, FRAGILE 
STATES AND SITUATIONS OF FRAGILITY: FRANCE’S POLICY PAPER, 27 September 2007. 
Yet France has not produced a list of countries against their fragility criteria, based on an 
interview with senior French official, Paris, March 2008.  
21
 See also DFID Why we need to work more effectively in Fragile States, January 2005 
22
 See World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/licus/, See Also, World Bank, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTDEBTDEPT/0,,contentMDK:20260411~m
enuPK:64166739~pagePK:64166689~piPK:64166646~theSitePK:469043,00.html 
23
 OECD DAC, Organisation for Economic Coopertion and Development, Development 
Assistance Committee, Statebuilding in Situations of Fragility, August 2008 
24
 OECD DAC From Fragility to Resilience  2008 (Jones) 
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based organization contends - will require donors to make a shift in current aid 
policies by focusing on statebuilding as the central objective and secondarily 
through adopting “‘whole-of-government’” approaches.25 “This vision reflects a 
growing consensus that legitimate, representative and service-delivery focused 
statebuilding has to become a central objective for donor engagement if one of 
the major causes for fragility is to be addressed.  Support to statebuilding is thus 
increasingly seen as a means to assist in preventing fragility and conflict and not 
only as an objective in post-conflict missions.”26  
 
 
• Stabilisation and Counter-Insurgency Operations (COIN)  
 
There is considerable overlap and indeed often confusion between stabilisation 
operations and COIN. The UK Stabilisation Unit Guidance Note states that COIN 
“is often at the heart of stabilisation and is often an integral part of providing 
stability in fragile states.”27  In addition, it suggests that “stabilisation may be 
broader than counter insurgency.” This statement reinforces the lack of 
conceptual clarity surrounding stabilization and is indicative of the overwhelming 
influence of and current focus on the Afghanistan experience. 
 
Given the provenance of COIN as a military activity it is not surprising that the 
military interprets stabilisation through a COIN ‘lens’.  Being entirely comfortable 
with this conceptual overlap, the military has used it to shape, and sometimes 
serve as, their understanding and approaches to stabilisation. “The military 
contribution to security and stabilisation encompasses COIN as well as elements 
of nation building.”28 Unfortunately, the implied relationship between the two 
activities has only served to make stabilisation and stabilisation operations 
somewhat unpalatable across elements of the wider cross-Government 
community.   Julian Lindley French suggests that this dual usage of terms also 
occurs between military approaches as well and states that:  
 
[…]hitherto the contrast between S&R (stabilisation and reconstruction) 
and counterinsurgency has had more to do with contrasting political and 
military methods than dealing with different threats. There needs to be a 
search for common ground between the often overly–militarized approach 
of US forces and the overly–political approach of many European forces.29   
 
Other authors like Colin Gray have further reinforced this dual usage of terms by 
stating that “stability operations need to be understood as integral to 
                                                 
25
 OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations, 2007  
26
 Ibid  
27
 UK Stabilisation Unit, Guidance Note, p. 14.  
28
 Draft JDP 340  para 231, p 2-12 
29
 Lindley–French, Julian and Robert Hunter, Enhancing Stabilisation and Reconstruction 
Operations, CSIS, December 2, 2008 
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counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine. “30  In a recent article in Parameters, he 
firmly locates stabilisation in the context of COIN and argues that "stability 
operations should be conducted as a part of counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency strategy, and not as a separate matter.”31  Such linkages only 
serve to drive a wedge between the military actors and their much needed 
diplomatic, development and humanitarian partners.  
 
• Stability Operations and Civil-Military integration 
 
Andrew Natsios suggested that there is significant overlap between development 
and military doctrinal principles. In describing what he popularized as the ‘nine 
principles of reconstruction and development’ he observed that “the continued 
development of the military’s stabilisation operations platform and the increasing 
frequency of civil-military collaborations mean this convergence is here to stay.”32 
Given the dominance of the military interpretation suggested above, government 
attempts to achieve civil-military integration is evidenced by the creation of the 
Stabilisation Unit in UK, O/CRS in the US, and START in Canada.  A main 
feature of pursuing a ‘whole-of-government stabilisation’ is the commitment to 
retaining and deploying more skilled civilians to the field.  However, this approach 
also recognizes the need for the military to be more aware of political, 
governance and development dynamics in these theatres of operation.  
 
Civil military integration has been pursued under a plethora of banners and 
headings including ‘‘whole-of-government’ approaches’, the ‘comprehensive 
approach’, ‘unity of effort’, and ‘coherence’.  Both the UK and US military stability 
operations doctrine refer to the requirement for unity of effort.  JDP 340 suggests 
that  
focus must be maintained on achieving unity of effort […] it should be 
recognised that for some actors, for example non-governmental 
organisations, it may be inappropriate, or they may be unable or unwilling, 
to participate in such formal mechanisms. In some cases, therefore, de-
confliction may be the preferred goal.33  
 
The publication further recognizes these inherent tensions and suggests that at 
best the development of good working relationships is extremely important, while 
other “groups will inevitably view any coalition force with open suspicion and 
therefore the focus should be on cooperation rather than coordination. The wider 
application of a comprehensive way of working will go a long way to reducing the 
friction between friendly groups.”34  The conclusion acknowledges that 
                                                 
30Gray, Colin S. “Stability Operations in Strategic Perspective: A Skeptical 
View.” Parameters, Summer 2006. pp 4 -14 
31
 Ibid  
32
 Natsios, Andrew S. “The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development,” Parameters , 
Autumn 2005. v35, #3, pp4-20 
33
 Draft JDP 340 para 240, p 2-15 
34
 Draft JDP 240  (2) 9-6 
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establishing and maintaining unity of effort amongst those involved is a 
perennially difficult process.35 
 
Numerous obstacles continue to plague the civil-military relationship. Andrea 
Barbara Baumann suggests that unity of effort is set out as a panacea to 
integration.  However, she indicates that cultural differences should be regarded 
as one of the main obstacles and that ’effective civil-military co-operation is 
unlikely to be achieved on the basis of a matrix dividing tasks and allocating 
resources between individual agencies.”36  Baumann also discusses the 
imbalance across the defence, diplomacy and development contributions, 
throughout the lifespan of an operation.  She describes one particular imbalance 
as being the limited ability of the military to contribute to the political arena, 
despite this being such an essential component.  Finally, the argument questions 
whether the structures backing such operations are robust enough to support the 
fluid nature of the operating environments particularly when delivering effect 
demands a tri-departmental approach.  
 
• Early recovery  
 
Notwithstanding the lack of conceptual clarity between actors who have 
traditionally intervened under very different operational environmental conditions, 
there remains a lack of understanding and agreement between the various 
individuals and communities which operate in the same ‘space’ during hot 
operations in terms of what is required to bring about stability.  The humanitarian 
and development communities concentrate on early recovery and peacebuilding 
while the military and political communities engage in stabilisation operations in 
order to facilitate statebuilding.  There is also a recognition between these 
disciplines that “the activity that most overlaps with stabilisation is ‘early 
recovery’, which has political and security dimensions as well as development 
objectives.”37  Interestingly, both sides of the definitional divide appear to rely on 
similar sets of principles, in particular the importance of ‘local ownership’; with a 
focus on the need to secure stability and to establish the peace, to resuscitate 
markets, livelihoods, and services, and the state capacities necessary to foster 
them; and to build core state capacity to manage political, security and 
development processes.  
 
The early recovery agenda is quickly gaining ground in bilateral and multilateral 
policy circles,38 is a popular term amongst humanitarians and development 
                                                 
35
 Draft JDP 340  para 107, p 1-4 
36
 Baumann, Andrea Barbara, "Clash of Organisational Cultures? The Challenge of integrating 
civilian and military efforts in stabilisation operations" RUSI Journal December 2008, Vol 153, No 
6, pp 70-73. p 71 
37
 UK Stabilisation Unit, Guidance Note, p. 14. 
38
 In April 2009 the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) co-sponsored the Practitioners’ and Policy Forum on ‘Early Recovery - 
Addressing Gaps and Dilemmas Together’ in Copenhagen. The aim was to develop a shared 
understanding of early recovery for countries in the wake of natural or man-made disasters, and 
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practitioners, and is used across the OECD-DAC and the Office of the 
Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) communities.  Like stabilisation, 
early recovery is a relatively new concept.  With similarities to stabilisation 
operations, UNDP suggests that “it addresses a critical gap in coverage between 
humanitarian relief and long-term recovery - between reliance and self-
sufficiency.”39  Whilst various attempts have been made to develop a shared 
understanding of the term, the concept remains elusive.  Early recovery is most 
frequently described as a ’shared space between humanitarian and development 
actors’ to provide the foundation for full recovery and for the quick reduction of 
humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of a crisis.  Like stabilisation, early 
recovery emphasizes the need to work with and support national and local 
authorities through the restoration of government legitimacy.  In this context, local 
ownership is stressed repeatedly.  UNDP frames early recovery as something 
which “aims to generate self-sustaining, nationally-owned, and resilient 
processes for post crisis recovery [and] encompasses the restoration of basic 
services, livelihoods, shelter, governance, security and rule of law, environment 
and social dimensions, including the reintegration of displaced populations.”40  As 
such, in the absence of a general consensus on what is meant by early recovery, 
both in policy and programmatic terms, the concept remains open to different 
interpretations.  
 
The international community has long been concerned with the need to 
strengthen the synergies between humanitarian and development assistance and 
improve the transition from relief to recovery and, ultimately, to longer-term 
development. Over the past decade, efforts to address the humanitarian and 
development ‘gap’, such as the ‘relief-development continuum’ and ‘linking relief, 
rehabilitation and development’, have resulted in significant discussion and 
conceptual development41 but little substantive impact through practice.  The 
early recovery approach is the latest expression of the ‘linking’ debates and there 
is widespread agreement that it involves “a multidimensional process of recovery 
that begins in a humanitarian setting.  The concept is guided by development 
principles that seek to build on humanitarian programmes and catalyze 
sustainable development opportunities. “42 
                                                                                                                                                 
outline a set of commitments and action points to strengthen the international response and help 
countries recover from crises as early as possible. The Practitioners’ Forum, brought together 
over 200 representatives from the UN, donor organisations, developing countries governments, 
NGOs, international financial institutions, and research institutes, to discuss the current 
international approach to early recovery. The discussion contributed to the key output of this 
event: a draft statement on ‘Joint Action for Strengthening International Support to Early 
Recovery’.  
39
 UNDP, BCPR, Guidance Note on Early Recovery, p. 9  
40
 UNDP op cit, p 7.  
41
 in particular see the work of Buchanan-Smith, M. & Maxwell, S., “Linking Relief and 
Development: an Introduction and an Overview.:  IDS Bulletin, Vol 24., 1994, Buchanan-Smith, 
M. & Maxwell, S., “Linking Relief and Development.” IDS Report on a workshop, IDS: Sussex, 
1994., Buchanan-Smith, M.& Maxwell, S. “Linking Relief and development: A case Study of 
Botswana.”  Brighton: IDS, 1995. 
42
 UNDP Guidance Note on Early Recovery, see also UN OCHA work on early recovery 
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Community of practice affiliation shapes stakeholder perceptions. For 
humanitarian actors, it seems to be linked to sectoral efforts to promote 
livelihoods activities at community-level.43  For development actors, it appears to 
be linked to efforts to strengthen national recovery capacity, ensure ownership of 
the process, and identify opportunities to initiate development activities at the 
earliest stage of a crisis.44  The UNDP Guidance Note on recovery suggests that 
early recovery occurs in parallel with humanitarian activities, but its objectives, 
mechanisms and expertise are different.  Early recovery aims to ‘augment on-
going humanitarian assistance operations; support spontaneous recovery 
initiatives by affected communities; and establish the foundations for longer-term 
recovery.’45  Finally, for some donors and developing country representatives, 
early recovery is related to peacebuilding initiatives and efforts to restore 
security.  
• Statebuilding and Peacebuilding  
 
The above section sets out the implications of state fragility and centrality of 
statebuilding to stabilisation operations in helping to foster legitimate and 
effective states in the wake of armed conflict. Statebuilding has been placed at 
the core of stability operations.46 The UK Stabilisation Unit Guidance Note 
indicates that:  
 
Effective statebuilding is perhaps the central priority in stabilisation and 
needs to be understood in three dimensions: achieving a political 
settlement hat incorporates the interests of the main power and interest 
groups; putting into place the state’s ‘survival functions’ – security, the rule 
of law and taxation; and being able in some measure to meet citizens’ 
expectations on the availability of basic services.47  
 
Statebuilding is about strengthening state-society relations and working with all 
three branches of government (executive, judiciary, legislative) and civil society. 
Statebuilding takes place at all levels of government - from local to national. 
 
One of the common threads to emerge from this literature review is the complex 
and contingent nature of peacebuilding and statebuilding processes and the 
inherent tensions between them. There is also a conceptual discord between 
those who favour statebuilding (amongst them militaries and foreign ministries) 
and those who prefer a peacebuilding approach (amongst them the development 
and humanitarian communities).  However, there is also recognition across the 
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46
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Stabilisation and “Post-Conflict” Reconstruction.  See also UK and US doctrine 
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community of practitioners that the military will often find itself supporting both 
peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts, without necessarily developing the 
appropriate linkages between the two areas.  There are numerous attempts 
underway to grapple with the discord between these two mutually reinforcing 
concepts.48  The July 2009 publication of the DFID White Paper “Building A 
Common Future” reinforced this conceptual divide and placed it at the centre of 
DFID’s future strategic direction.  For practitioners and policymakers supporting 
stabilsation interventions, the juxtaposition of these concepts must be addressed 
in a thoughtful way.  Past stabilisation operations in countries such as Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Haiti, Liberia and many others have prioritized short-term 
stabilisation imperatives (with the priority of ending conflict and securing stability) 
often at the cost of undermining prospects for securing a sustainable, long-term 
peace.   Reconciling approaches to end violent conflict and gross human rights 
violations, with approaches and processes to bring about a longer-term peace in 
a mutually reinforcing way may require a more in-depth look at how 
peacebuilding imperatives during stabilisation operations should inform the 
statebuilding efforts which follow a formal peace agreement.49  At the moment, 
there still appears to be an alarming disconnect between these two concepts.  
The OECD-DAC suggests that statebuilding is distinct from peacebuilding, and 
states that: 
 
Peacebuilding, understood as activities by international or national actors 
to prevent violent conflict and institutionalise peace, is often an important 
part of the statebuilding dynamic, helping to consolidate security and 
political stability and establish the foundations for trust and social 
reconciliation among societal groups. However, it is important not to 
confuse the immediate challenges of peacebuilding with the long-term 
challenges of statebuilding, which will evolve over generations. While 
peacebuilding offers modalities for overcoming some of the greatest 
challenges to statebuilding, the need to build ever deeper state-society 
relations is likely to remain.50  
 
Whilst the difference between the concepts is not in dispute, the way in which 
policymakers and practitioners across the various constituencies interpret the 
roles and activities associated with each concept has yet to be clarified.   
 
 
                                                 
48
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 Ann Fitz-Gerald, “Security Sector Reform and Stabilsiation Operations:  Close Allies or Strange 
Bedfellows?” in Mark Sedra (ed)  The Future of SSR , University of Waterloo Press:  Canada, 
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IV. CHALLENGES TO ‘‘WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT’51 STABILISATION’ 
 
Having made the case that fragile states pose a security and development 
challenge, it is now widely accepted that the ‘‘whole-of-government approach’ is 
central to the success of stabilisation operations in order to stabilise and 
reconstruct fragile states.  These are ambitious and complex undertakings which 
require that donors draw upon and integrate the entire range of policy 
instruments at their disposal spanning the traditionally independent spheres of 
diplomacy, development and defense—as well as trade, intelligence and law 
enforcement. This ’whole-of-government approach’ has been widely accepted 
across the spectrum of actors involved in stabilisation operations, including both 
bilateral and multilateral organizations.  It has been captured in UK and US 
doctrine and has been developed by the OECD-DAC.52  Indeed, in the UK the 
Cabinet Office has stated that ‘‘the major security challenges require an 
integrated response that cuts across departmental lines and traditional policy 
boundaries.”53  Mindful of the bureaucratic, legal and cultural constraints to 
whole-of-government activities more generally, Andrea Barbara Baumann 
observes that, “despite widespread consensus over the need for an holistic 
approach in theory, the implementation of comprehensive or whole-of-
government strategies has given rise to debate, controversy and concern in 
practice.”54 
  
Where the primary challenge appears to be in promoting coherence55 amongst 
and within governments, integration across departments and organization has so 
far proven to be variable.  Whilst the most significant contribution made by  
whole-of-government approaches rests with the levels of shared analysis56 – and 
the ability to diagnose issues, risks and challenges from multiple perspectives – 
there is little doubt that the challenges in building coherency supporting joined-up 
operations has been grossly underestimated.  Julian Lindley-French suggests 
that this will require overcoming intra–government rivalries and contrasting 
cultures and doctrines, and fostering unity of effort.  He suggests that host 
countries must be able to deal with a relatively limited number of points of contact 
and that the Comprehensive Approach needs to include a new cadre of elite 
civilian and military planners and commanders able to plan, direct, and manage 
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 This section includes the plethora of terms that are generally grouped together with ‘whole-of-
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 OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, sets out the 
requirement for coherence.  
56
 Fitz-Gerald, “Security Sector Reform and National Security Frameworks:  Towards a Value-
based approach to strategic planning” in Jack Caravelli and Peter Trim (eds) Strategising for 
Resilience, Nova Science Publishing, Washington, 2009. 
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operations as a single team.57 These thoughts were echoed by Andrea Barbara 
Baumann who advocates that recognizing organizational culture as an obstacle 
to co-operation between military and civilian organizations deserves greater 
consideration.58 
 
Thus, evidence suggests the existence of a ‘strategic gap’59 at the planning and 
prioritization stage, while the ‘civilian gap’ continues to expose inadequate 
capabilities and capacities at the implementation stage.  Finally a ‘cultural gap’ 
appears to impede on the integration necessary to achieve a whole-of-
government approach to stabilisation and deliver a unity of purpose towards a 
shared goal.  While a driving principle has been achieving ‘local ownership’ the 
whole-of-government literature focuses on integration across international actors.  
These disparities become further exacerbated by a ‘generational gap’ across 
government departments.  For example, due to the military’s historical (and post-
colonial) experience in longer-term post-conflict reconstruction, military aid to the 
civil authorities (MACA), and UN peacekeeping, today’s military unit commanders 
and operational commanders alike are equally comfortable with the relationship 
between security and development.  In contrast, the same generational 
congruence cannot be said for development and diplomatic departments whose 
senior management may still be deeply routed in more traditional paradigms.60   
 
One could argue that the priorities set out in the 2009 DFID White Paper 
indicates a shift in the ‘generational gap’, certainly within the UK.  The White 
Paper emphasizes the link between impoverished countries and countries 
emerging from conflict and commits 50% of its future international aid funds to 
supporting conflict-affected countries.61  This is a significant development at the 
highest levels of the organization.  The Paper also commits DFID to tripling its 
spending on security and justice-related programmes.  Lastly, the new policy 
document introduces the brand ‘UKAID’ which suggests that, in the future, DFID 
will seek a more balanced approach to supporting both national interests and the 
interests of its wider multilateral community.     
 
Both the new UK military doctrine JDP 3-40 and the US army doctrine FM 3-07 
set out definitions for whole-of-government and comprehensive approaches, both 
of which focus on the need to “achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.”  The 
US document suggests that a ‘whole-of-government’ approach is one that 
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Operations, CSIS, December 2, 2008 
58
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 Ibid, Fitz-Gerald, p. 
61
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integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the US 
Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.62  This compares 
with the stated US definition for the comprehensive approach which is described 
as one which integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies 
of the US Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, 
multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward 
a shared goal.”63  Therefore, from a definitional perspective, there appears to be 
little difference between the two concepts with the exception of looking outside of 
government in terms of the relationships required to achieve a ‘comprehensive 
approach’.  
 
Patrick Stewart argues that the “rhetorical commitment to ‘whole-of-government’ 
approaches conceals fundamental dilemmas and difficult choices in the quest for 
policy coherence.64  His research found that  
 
Individual donor governments are still struggling to develop a strategic 
approach to state fragility; to define the goals of their national policies; to 
agree on departmental divisions of labor and coordination mechanisms; to 
mobilize adequate resources to meet the challenge of fragile states; to 
harmonize their approaches with other donors; to align their efforts with 
host governments; and to monitor and evaluate the impact of their policy 
interventions.65  
 
 
Aside from the ‘stove-piping’ criticisms, one could also argue that 
‘operationalising’ whole-of-government approaches has incurred difficulties due 
to the divisions developed over the years between the evolution of principles and 
practice in both communities.  Whilst efforts made by the OECD-DAC and the 
wider Security Sector Reform community to develop principles which better 
support an improved ‘mantra’ for the security-development nexus, merging the 
‘tools’ and ‘instruments’ supporting each area has become more challenging.  
For example, over the years the development community has observed the 
creation and further evolution of instruments such as Sector Wide Approaches 
(SWAPs), Public Sector Reform (PSR), Public Expenditure Management (PEM), 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSP).  This stands in contrast to the very different range of ‘tools’ 
available to the traditional security community including, for example, use of 
force, coercive diplomacy, crisis response initiatives, and Chapter 6 and 7 
peacekeeping operations under the UN Charter.  One could argue that recent 
efforts have drawn on the PRSP as a framework which recognizes both strategic 
level security and development imperatives.  This combined agenda is captured 
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in the more recent PRSPs of countries like Sierra Leone (2004), Uganda (2004) 
and Afghanistan (2007), and reflects progress in this area.66  However, only time 
will tell if the PRSP process has been successful in providing the necessary in-
country and locally owned planning process for addressing security and 
development challenges simultaneously.       
 
Recovering from War also identified evidence of a capacity gap which indicates 
that stabilisation operations are “not properly supported with adequate 
capabilities and capacities and tend to remain too focused on institutional shape, 
structure, decision–making and reporting procedures.”67 This civilian gap is 
particularly acute and bilateral and multilateral actors are currently seized with 
overcoming this deficit of deployable civilian capacity.  US army doctrine FM 3-07 
acknowledges this challenge and suggests the imbalance of military and civilian 
capacity further indicates a ‘cultural gap’.  “A primary challenge for integrating 
civilian and military efforts into a ‘whole-of-government’ approach is the differing 
capacities and cultures in civilian agencies compared to those of military 
forces.”68  The challenge brought by the paucity of civilian actors has also been 
highlighted by Rod Matthews and Jay Lucas’s RUSI article on “Stabilisation and 
Reconstruction: Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan”69, and in the media by 
analysts such as Sir Hilary Synott, who states that “the lack of civilian 
engagement has been a serious setback for the Army's courageous efforts to 
stabilise areas of conflict.”70  This shortage has been brought into sharp focus in 
the non-benign operating environments of Iraq and Afghanistan where a defining 
feature of both engagements has been the relative lack of civilian actors (for 
example, compared with the approximate 60,000-plus operating in the small 
confines of Kosovo between 1999 and 2000). 
 
   
Recognition of the civilian capacity gap has led to growing efforts to further 
develop and improve civilian capacity.  Regional organizations and some national 
governments are making significant contributions in this field by way of 
developing or refining their civilian policies, structures and doctrine.  For example 
the governments of Switzerland, Canada and Norway have created rosters of 
readily deployable trained experts.  Other governments have created inter-
agency departments, which will enjoy the support of both an internal civil service 
‘cadre’ of stabilisation advisers and an external roster of experts.  The 
development of the UK’s Stabilisation Unit, Canada’s START, and the US S/CRS 
serve as examples of this inter-agency approach.  The development of the 
internal and external extended staff complement will be supported by ongoing 
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training targeting both the policymaker initiating stabilisation planning from the 
national capital and the practitioners on the ground responsible for 
implementation.  The Nordic countries, Germany and Japan have all created 
separate civilian crisis management centres which combine research, training 
and recruitment.  The EU has identified areas of civilian crisis management 
mechanisms within its competencies, and has developed Crisis Response 
Teams for rapid deployment.   
 
The UK has made rapid progress in the area of developing civilian capacity for 
stabilisation deployments.  In his 19 June 2009 national security statement, UK 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown emphasized the Government’s commitment to 
developing a 1000-strong standby civilian cadre of stabilisation experts.71  As 
part of this effort, the UK Stabilisation Unit provides a two-tiered approach to 
training for both initial planning initiation supporting stabilisation and the ‘on-the 
ground’ planning which follows these initial policy-led planning activities.  A 
similar approach to training for initial stabilisation planning is being pursued by 
the US Government and led by the S/CRS.72     
 
Such regional and national initiatives complement a renewed concern at the UN 
concerning the availability of suitable rapidly deployable civilians capable of 
overseeing the political aspects of missions or contributing to key statebuilding 
functions.  Efforts to share lessons and good practice across wider bilateral and 
multilateral communities will be key to the success of each national training 
programme.  Moreover, ongoing monitoring of stabilisation experiences will also 
be required to inform training content.  As the concept of stabilisation gains 
greater strategic clarity, training curricula should also expand to address planning 
and operational response requirements for a range of different theatres of 
instability.   
 
 
• Challenges to Integration and Interoperability  
 
The main challenge to whole-of-government stabilisation at the strategic level is 
coordinating interagency policies, cultures and capacities.  Overcoming these 
challenges will demand a strong understanding of the inter-linkages across 
stabilisation activities.  However, this remains an under-researched area with 
little to no evidence-based literature.  Whilst different methodologies are now 
being experimented with (such as ‘triangulation’) to better expose these inter-
linkages, more practical measures must be taken to provide resources dedicated 
to monitoring inter-linkages across different ‘lines of activities’ – and their 
medium-to-longer term impact - on an ongoing basis.73  This knowledge should 
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then to used to better inform prioritization and sequencing strategies for the 
interventionist forces.   
 
The UK doctrine is set in the context of the inherent challenge of the requirement 
to operationalise ‘whole-of-government’ through interoperability.  Rather than 
prescriptive end-state conditions outlined in FM 3-07, JDP 3-40 sets out the 
principles guiding the military contribution to stabilisation operations as:  primacy 
of political purpose; foster host nation governance, authority and indigenous 
capacity; understand the context; unity of effort; neutralise and counteract 
irregular actors; meet the security and basic needs of the population; credibility; 
perseverance, and adaptation.  
 
In contrast, the overarching framework for the US army ‘stability operations’ 
doctrine is the following five endstate conditions:  a safe and secure environment; 
established rule of law; social well-being; stable governance; a sustainable 
economy.  This framework provides both ‘the underpinning for strategic whole-of-
government planning, as well as a ‘focal point’ for integrating specific tasks.  The 
preference towards the use of ‘endstate conditions’, rather than the principle-
based focus which the UK Government presents, is also reflected in the 2005 US 
Government’s “Essential Tasks Toolkit”; the 2006 “Metrics for Interagency 
Planning  for Conflict Transformation” and the more recent United States Institute 
of Peace (USIP) project setting out ‘Measures of Effectiveness in Peace and 
Conflict Environments, (MPICE).  
 
In describing the humanitarian and development concerns with the integration of 
military activities into areas traditionally the domain of these civilian actors, 
Matthews and Lucas74 suggest that, broadly speaking, the following two 
concerns can be identified: 
 
[…]Firstly, from a technical perspective, the military is viewed as not 
having the requisite skills to implement a development or aid programme. 
Secondly, from a political perspective, military engagement represents a 
worrying erosion of humanitarian space and the neutrality this confers. 
Whilst the second of these two issues is important to wider policy debate, 
the security context in which these joint missions are unfolding 
necessitates assessment of the former as a priority: where the military is 
required to work alongside civilians in delivering reconstruction and 
construction efforts then we must maximise our joint effectiveness.75 
 
Further challenges include issues related to leadership, a lack of senior 
management well-versed and comfortable in operations which span the security-
development nexus, and the encroachment of humanitarian ‘space’.  Whilst there 
is little evidence-based literature to support these statements, they are backed up 
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by interviews with a high number of personnel returning from Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  
 
The lack of leadership and ‘buy-in’ by one particular department or agency has 
been cited as problematic at the field level.  Lindley-French states that “key to 
S&R success is helping local states enhance the performance of state functions, 
whether at a national, regional/provincial, or local level…key actors will need to 
“buy in” to the goal of statebuilding from the outset of an intervention.”76  In a 
Special Report published by USIP in 2005, Bob Perito suggests that the US 
experience – and multinational PRT program in particular - would benefit from an 
agreed concept of operations, an effective central coordinating authority, the 
delimitation of civilian and military roles, and improved civilian agency staffing, 
funding, and administrative support.”77  In his May 2009 paper analyzing the US 
Administration’s approach in Afghanistan, Dane Smith states that critics in the 
US State Department have charged that “Afghanistan did not receive serious and 
sustained direction from the Secretary of State during the Bush Administration 
[and that] there was no unified civilian command structure on Afghanistan.78 
 
Encroachment of ‘space’ and how to reconcile with humanitarians in non-benign 
environments has brought into sharp focus the entrenchment of communities of 
practice and their principles into distinct and separate camps limiting the 
achievement of shared goals and objectives. “Reconstruction projects suffered 
from a lack of coordination and oversight. Military involvement in development 
brought criticism from relief agencies that claimed it put them at risk by blurring 
the distinction between combatants and humanitarian workers.”79 This 
observation resonates with the discovery that NGO’s have not been willing to 
work with the military/PRT in Afghanistan. Despite 15 yrs….  
 
 
• Interoperability through the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 
experience  
 
With lingering questions over issues surrounding structure, interoperability and 
leadership in stabilisation operations, one is provoked to inquire into the stated 
successes of PRTs to date. The published literature which discusses problems 
related to the conduct of PRTs can be reduced to the challenges of 
operationalising interoperability and the doubt that gets cast over the viability of 
the comprehensive approach.  
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PRTs are small, joint civilian-military organizations whose mission is to promote 
governance, security, and reconstruction throughout Afghanistan80. As such they 
illustrate dramatically the challenges of operationalising both the whole-of-
government approach and more widely NATO’s comprehensive approach.  
Perito argues that the primary purpose of creating these outposts was political, 
but PRTs were also seen as a means for dealing with the causes of 
Afghanistan’s instability: terrorism, warlords, unemployment, and grinding 
poverty.81  The PRT has also been described as a concept which occupies “the 
intersection of military-led stability operations and civilian-led reconstruction 
activities, focused on coordination between security forces, development aid 
providers, and those working on capacity-building.”82  Dane Smith describes 
PRTs as groups of up to 80 persons, basically made up of military personnel with 
a small army of civil affairs section and a handful of State and USAID officials.  
Based on an interview with former US diplomat James Dobbins (who, in 2001, 
was appointed by former Secretary of State Powell as “envoy to the Afghan 
opposition”), Smith recites Dobbins comments as stating that “the military 
dominated PRTs were an admission of failure to achieve post-conflict security 
and a second-best approach to stabilisation and reconstruction.”83    
 
Despite this criticism, Bob Perito reminds us that originally,  
 
 At the end of the day PRTs are military, not development, organizations. 
As primarily military organizations, PRTs are better suited to security-
related tasks than to delivering development assistance. As military 
organizations, PRTs had an inherent difficulty coordinating on 
development projects, if they were ordered by higher military authorities to 
undertake operations. Not concentrating fully on creating a secure 
environment also risked failing to establish the level of stability required by 
other international actors with greater development expertise.”84  
 
 
Given the military provenance of PRTs and the institutionalization of military 
engagement in traditionally civilian activities, RUSI suggests that “PRTs, as they 
currently operate, remain a major obstacle to present and future engagement 
between the military and NGO communities.  If the PRT concept continues to 
define the roles and operational environment in conflict areas (i.e., if the military 
continues to engage directly in development work) – as discussed primarily in the 
Afghan context – this will impede engagement. 85 
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Whilst there is good practice in some individual PRTs, there is general 
agreement across donors that the outstanding challenges are rooted to the 
difficulties in operationalising a whole of government and comprehensive 
stabilisation concept.  A seminal piece of work on the PRT concept was 
undertaken by Colonel M.P. Jorgensen in his paper entitled “A Strategy for 
Effective Peace-Building: Canada’s Whole-of-Government Approach in 
Afghanistan.”  Jorgensen’s paper summarises the British, American and 
Canadian PRT experiences86 and suggests that the key challenges to an 
improved PRT concept include issues relating to leadership and ownership, 
planning, commitment, and measures of effectiveness and guidelines. Finally, it 
is worth remembering that PRT’s were never conceived as becoming mini-
consulates, and have a definite life span.  
 
 
V. UNINTENDED OUTCOMES IN STABILISATION ENVIRONMENTS 
 
Emerging from the list of PRT-related challenges, recent experience from 
returning PRT members have  brought to attention the unintended outcomes of 
not understanding the linkages across activities and lines of activity or 
development87  Based on a high level of interviews conducted with diplomatic, 
development and military personnel – all of whom had been involved in 
stabilisation operations during different intervention periods in Iraq and/or 
Afghanistan understanding these inter-linkages and both the negative and 
positive unintended outcomes is critical.  This was particularly important during 
times when decisions were being taken regarding priorities for military-led 
projects to enhance local confidence-building measures.  Such projects often fell 
under the label of ‘Quick Impact Projects’. 
Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are usually characterised as short-term, small-
scale initiatives that are designed to deliver an immediate impact. Experience in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan has suggested that QIPs’ role in stabilisation 
programmes is twofold; they provide ‘direct support’ to stabilisation through the 
protection of people and critical institutions and facilities and provide ‘indirect 
support’ to stabilisation through building confidence the legitimacy of local 
political authorities and processes.88  RUSI argues that  
While there was broad agreement that the military is not best placed or 
equipped to engage in long-term development projects, the effects of 
Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)/Commanders’ Emergency Response 
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Program (CERP) – aimed at short-term “hearts and minds” gains within a 
counterinsurgency context to build consent with a local community – 
served as a lightning rod for criticism of misguided military involvement in 
development work. QIPs can enable necessary, quick 
reconstruction/stabilisation projects (e.g. rebuild a bridge that was 
bombed) and serve as a mechanism to engage the local community and 
develop trust. However, a common theme in the discussions was that 
without in-depth local knowledge, commanders may work at cross 
purposes in ways that damage overall development goals.89 
 
 
For illustrative purposes, one example can be drawn from the British Army’s 
experience during 2003 in Basra, Iraq.  Based on a range of possible options on 
which to spend QIP funding, priority was given to the distribution of gas canisters 
to households in order to prevent the spread of disease due to a lack of potable 
drinking water.  After distributing gas canisters to most households which 
enabled the boiling of water, a number of positive consequences emerged.  The 
first observation was that the degree of basic service provisions had increased 
significantly, thus developing greater perceived credibility for the interventionist 
force.  This served to ‘disincentivise’ those exploiting black market opportunities 
to cater to the lack of access to basic services.   
 
Secondly, following the development of a ‘water board’ as a governing body 
monitoring and overseeing this local activity, the project served to strengthen an 
emerging civil society voice, as well as an embryonic political process, albeit at 
the municipal level.  However, over time this governance process strengthened 
and joined forces with the appropriate federal governance structures for 
infrastructure in Baghdad.  Overall levels of community safety were also 
enhanced as a result of this activity. 
 
A range of other examples could also be shared, some of which would support 
the example above and illuminate the range of positive unintended outcomes; 
some of which would expose a significant negative ‘net effect’.  However, for the 
purposes of this literature review, suffice it to say that the interview-based data 
collected in support of this research concluded that there is a critical need for 
monitoring and advisory capacity which supports interdependency analysis 
during stabilisation operations. Whether or not this process is captured or 
embedded in the PRT concept remains questionable.  
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
                                                 
89
 The RUSI Project on Civil-Military Relations. Workshop I: Increasing Understanding of Differing 
Defence, Development and Diplomatic Priorities  
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/24-25_May_Civ-Mil_Summary.pdf Accessed May 2009 
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The nascent writing on stabilisation operations is predominantly case specific 
and has been shaped by the UK, US and NATO experiences.  This literature 
review has set out the range of stabilisation contexts, including failed and fragile 
states, and a number of concepts, including early warning, statebuilding, 
peacebuilding, whole-of-government approaches, COIN and the underlying 
principles supporting the various approaches.  The research has demonstrated 
that there remains lack of conceptual clarity and agreement across these areas 
with an urgent requirement to mainstream work on stabilisation more broadly 
across work on fragility and instability.  This would be particularly helpful given 
that current way in which stabilisation as a term has become situated across a 
number of different epistemic communities, and at a time when significant and 
human technical and resources have been poured into this area.  These efforts 
must take stabilisation beyond the case of Afghanistan if the agenda it is to have 
longevity.  This will require more strategic thought to be applied to the whole 
notion of ‘instability’ and the various shapes and guises in which instability may 
well manifest.  Based on a range of emerging UK and US Government White 
Papers, military doctrinal publications and national security papers, there is a 
unique opportunity to offer the concept of stabilisation greater strategic clarity.  
 
Leadership supporting stabilisation interventions has also been discussed as an 
area which requires particular attention.  Earlier sections have highlighted the 
difficulties in operationalising whole-of-government approaches; indeed, one 
could argue that the same problems with this concept and more have been 
experienced with ‘whole-of-government stabilisation’.  Based on their experience 
in Afghanistan, recently returned policymakers and practitioners from a wide 
range of donor governments who supported this research have commented on 
the lack of clarity on leadership, and the specific entity, agency or government 
department serves as lead agent.  Other feedback suggested that the question 
surrounding ‘lead agent’ is in constant flux and often very spatially (geographic) 
and temporally dependent.     
 
Perhaps it is more realistic to better manage the expectations of stabilisation 
capacities of leading donor countries such as the UK, the US and Canada by 
retaining national stabilisation efforts as ‘operational enablers’ as opposed to 
policy leads.  It should also be the case that these operational entities be 
afforded the resources they require to become key players in Government and a 
‘port of first call’ for thematic and geographic policy leaders dealing with a wide 
range of issues surrounding ‘instability’.  The current focus by each of the above-
mentioned donor countries in prioritization the development of a ‘civil service 
cadre’90 (augmented by rosters of external experts) is one step towards achieving 
the human resources required to provide the operational lead on ‘whole-of-
government stabilisation’.  However, also critical in supporting this objective will 
                                                 
90
 The US Government refers to this combination of civil service and external expert contributions as a 
‘civilian surge capacity’.  This capacity is premised on a 3-tiered structure:An Active Component of the 
Civilian Response Corps (CRC-A), a Standby Response Component (CRC-S) and a Reserve component 
(CRC-R), the latter requiring congressional authorisation.    
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be the political commitment and ‘buy in’ from across each donor government to 
identify the appropriate models of leadership which will best facilitate the role of 
the stabilisation effort.  
 
Developing such political clarity and sustainable and structural resource systems 
supporting national stabilisation capacity will require ongoing commitment and 
leadership.  Earlier sections of this paper raised the issue of developing better 
strategic clarity on the concept of stabilisation.  The June 2009 UK Government’s 
‘NSS 2’ places stabilisation at the core of the Government’s response to fragile 
and failed states.91  This will send a very powerful and positive message across 
the UK Government regarding the critical role played by the departments’ 
stabilisation partner.  It is also expected to help maintain prominence of the 
mandate and core competencies of the UK Stabilisation Unit in the regular 
discussions of the Cabinet Office Committee on National Security, International 
Relations and Development (NSID).  Similar efforts to prioritise and make 
prominent US stabilisation capacity were captured in a 2006 speech delivered by 
former US Secretary of State Condolezza Rice to Georgetown University which 
included a paragraph on the S/CRS and stated that “we have an expansive 
vision for this new office, and let there be no doubt, we are committed to realizing 
it.”92      
 
The literature review has provided clear evidence of a paucity in evidence based 
literature in the areas of interlinkages across actors and activities in 
operationalising whole of government approaches. This is acutely evidenced at 
the policy level in the UK across the departmental white papers where 
stabilisation is mentioned as a tool of national power, yet it does not receive 
headlines in any of the policies individually or in the National Security Strategy, 
Furthermore there is a lack of solid empirical evidence highlighting the impact of 
unintended consequences and the implications for the military contribution to 
stabilization operations. Such evidence demonstrating outcomes, and positive or 
negative impacts is required to inform priorities and sequencing.  
 
A number of questions emerge for further study:  
 
• the need for more knowledge on unexpected outcomes in areas of activity 
where short-term requirements do not necessarily consider med-longer term 
effects;  
• How to develop common objectives for diplomatic, defence, security, 
finance and development actions? It is stated that joint analysis and the 
more systematic use of joint planning tools such as transitional results 
frameworks (including a set of stabilisation, state building and peace building 
goals) are likely to facilitate this process. 
                                                 
91
 UK’s new NSS… 
92
 Taken from Smith, op cit, p.22. 
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• How to provide incentives for officials from different policy communities to 
work together in capitals and at the field level?  
• How to maximise development commitment, contribution and impact in 
operations that are controversial?  
• How to overcome the more obvious obstacles to support a whole of system 
approach, governments and international organisations across the concepts 
of both whole of government and the comprehensive approach 
 
 
 
